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Abstract
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) policies, which aim to redefine how antibiotics are
used, reshape the veterinary profession’s relationships in at least two ways. The policies
can give state veterinarians greater power over practising veterinarians and thus change
the relationship between the profession and the government supposed to regulate it. The
policies also call for coordination with other relevant professionals, mainly in the areas
of human medicine and food safety, which can limit the veterinary profession’s
autonomous decision-making. Based on a survey of veterinarians working at different
levels of the administration and their non-veterinary colleagues in Switzerland, it is
shown that AMR policies, by strengthening the administration’s planning and super-
visory functions, do contribute to increased state control of the veterinary profession.
However, this shift is limited because implementing the policies requires negotiating
with representatives of the profession.
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Introduction
In the past 15 years or so, antibiotic resistance has become the public problem
that epitomises the ‘One Health’ approach promoted by international organisa-
tions (World Health Organization (WHO) 2014, 2015; World Organization for
Animal Health (OIE) 2016; European Commission 2017). This approach, which
aims to closely link human, animal, plant and environmental health policies
(Hinchliffe 2015), is presented as a new and necessary way of addressing the
complex and interlinked challenges of health policies in all their dimensions
(Woods et al. 2017). It also aims to help break down the barriers between
specialisms and between administrations (Chien 2013) that are seen as a cause
of dysfunctions and health crises. In the field of antimicrobial resistance (AMR)
policies, developing a ‘strategy’ that encompasses antibiotic use in human and
veterinary medicine is considered a crucial step by administrations and profes-
sionals in charge of developing ‘action plans’ and, at the international level, to
be a prerequisite for the success of AMR policies. The main argument is that
efforts must focus on both human and animal health, since resistant bacteria
cross the species barrier, and antibiotics, sometimes of the same class, are used
for both.
Public policies that address the problem of antibiotic resistance therefore
have the potential to substantially affect the dynamics of the veterinary profes-
sion, even if they do not ‘regulate’ it in the narrow sense of the term (Bonnaud
and Fortané 2018, Hobson-West and Timmons 2016). Indeed, they concern the
prescription of antibiotics (Fortané 2016; Jensen et al. 2018), which is an
integral part both of the practice of urban and rural veterinarians and of their
professional autonomy—although, as these public policies focus on rural veter-
inarians specialising in livestock, this article will concentrate on the latter. It
should be added that veterinarians working within administrations are key to
developing and implementing action plans against antimicrobial resistance, as
has been the case with Switzerland’s ‘Strategy on Antibiotic Resistance’ (see
Box 1). This article examines these state veterinarians’ characteristics and
position statements in order to provide a sociological analysis of the trajectories
of public policies against AMR and of the instruments used.1 More specifically,
we aim to show how these state veterinarians interact with professional veter-
inary organisations and practising veterinarians. Rather than assume that the
veterinary profession is a homogeneous one, this approach focuses on different
segments of the veterinary profession in order to sketch out how One Health
AMR policies have contributed to breaking down boundaries and transforming
this professional group and its regulation.
1 Work that develops this type of analysis to shed light on contemporary veterinary public health policies
remains scarce (Alam 2007; Grant and Greaves, 2009; Ollivier 2013 on the European veterinary
administration).
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Beyond these declarations of intent (Box 1), this article examines how
relationships between different types of actors result in some of these fields
of activity being prioritised over others as implementation of the StAR pro-
gresses2. It focuses on veterinarians within the state administration in their
pivotal role between the profession and the state in developing and
implementing public action in veterinary medicine. In sociology of professions
terms, these veterinarians working for the authorities can be described as
‘professional bureaucrats’, i.e. members of a profession (recognisable by their
prestige, their certifications, their capacity for self-regulation) who have the
particularity of practising within bureaucratic organisations. Like other profes-
sionals of this type (doctors, teachers, lawyers), veterinary bureaucrats face
dilemmas in their daily work due to conflicts between their roles as members
of the veterinary profession and of the state administration—Noordegraaf (2007
and 2013) has described them as ‘hybrid professionals’; another term is ‘public
veterinarians’. Public veterinarians can exercise state power over practising
veterinarians by acting as advisors and experts in standard setting (legislative
and project design, planning activities) or by performing frontline tasks (ad-
ministrative enforcement tasks, inspections of veterinary practices, farms or
slaughterhouses). In operating more or less autonomously within the profession
as well as within the state administration, this group blurs the boundary
between the two. This makes it possible to study the articulation between state
regulation and professional regulation, two modes of regulation that the sociol-
ogy of professions3 and public policy analysis have long considered distinct if
not antagonistic (but see Demazière 2018; Bezes et al. 2011).
2 Between 2009 and 2017, there was a 50.7% drop in antibiotic sales, particularly in the veterinary field, with a
further drop of 1.3% in 201 FSVO 2018).
3 However, neo-Weberians have shown that self-regulation of prestigious professions is carried out through
legal mechanisms endorsed by the authorities (Demazière 2018).
The Swiss strategy to combat antibiotic resistance, known by the acronym StAR, was 
approved by the Swiss Federal Council in 2015 (FOPH 2015; FOPH and FSVO, 2015), after 
being formulated rather late compared to other countries. It involves four federal 
administrative offices in coordination (see below). Based on the One Health approach, it 
includes eight fields of activity:
- ‘monitoring’ of the progression of resistance in both human and veterinary medicine;
- ‘prevention’, which limits infections pre-emptively, notably through vaccines;
- ‘appropriate use’ of antibiotics in accordance with guidelines for their prescription;
- ‘the fight against resistance’ proper to minimise the spread of resistant germs;
- ‘research and development‘, with the aim of filling existing gaps and generating new 
research, in particular around new antibiotics or the transmission mechanisms of 
resistance;
- ‘professional and interdisciplinary cooperation‘ to successfully combat problems;
- ‘information and education‘ to raise awareness among professionals and the general 
public;
- ‘implementation of the general conditions‘ for maintaining the efficacy of antibiotics. 
In 2018, a first review showed that the efforts undertaken have contributed to reduced
antibiotic use in both human and animal medicine.
2
Box 1 An example of a national plan: the StAR
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The management of antibiotic resistance and antibiotic use is transforming the
veterinary profession. How do the various segments and specialisations within the
profession cope with their acknowledged core ability to prescribe medicinal products
being called into question (Abbott 1988; for human medicine, see Freidson 2001)? Are
state veterinarians in a position to impose a ‘state vision’ on the proper use of
antibiotics on their private practice colleagues, in particular rural ones who specialise
in livestock and on whom antibiotic resistance policies primarily focus?4 Do they
approach other groups of ‘professional bureaucrats’ while developing policies? Or do
they resist change because they share the concerns of their veterinary peers?
To answer these questions, this article focuses on veterinary bureaucrats and their
relationships with other government professionals who deal with animal health or food
products of animal origin. We draw on a survey of reforms in food safety inspection.5
In this context, we met twenty-six public veterinarians working either in the national
administration in Bern or in one of four cantonal administrations. Hierarchically, they
are heads of departments, heads of units or laboratories or employees; we interviewed
some retired public veterinarians due to their long career. We also interviewed nine
chemical engineers, six food engineers, seven chemical laboratory technicians and six
other specialists (doctors, biologists, lawyers working in the same administrative units).
The interviewees’ socio-professional characteristics and careers were analysed using
the SPSS programme.6 A textual analysis of the interview transcripts was carried out
using Atlas.ti software. We also refer to the administrative documents (reports, action
plans, brochures) produced by these professionals. Although we did not interview
practising veterinarians in this initial project, we supplemented our data with an
analysis of the reports of the Swiss Veterinary Society (SVS) and additional interviews
with professionals more directly involved in the implementation of StAR—three
veterinarians who are members of the SVS, three agricultural engineers and a federal
veterinarian in charge of the database on veterinary medicinal products.
After presenting how the veterinary profession is organised in Switzerland, including in
the administration, we show that this professional group did not initiate the management of
antibiotic resistance, but at first simply reacted to the regulation of veterinary medicinal
products that preceded the StAR (Part 1). In a second step, as part of the development of
AMR policy, veterinarians at the top echelons of central government were given responsi-
bility for unavoidable reforms. Despite calls for increased collaborationwith actors in human
medicine and throughout the food chain, veterinary bureaucrats retained control over the
implementation of measures relating to veterinary medicine (Part 2), which resulted in other
professional bureaucrats leaving the animal side of the problem entirely to the veterinary
profession. Moreover, public veterinarians have found it difficult to put into practice their
greater control over the sale and use of antibiotics, due to a lack of bureaucratic resources and
4 The main reasons that antibiotic resistance policies focus on livestock veterinarians are, firstly, that the
problem of antibiotic resistance is primarily framed as a problem of the quantity of antibiotics prescribed and,
secondly, that veterinary public health policies more broadly generally concern livestock. Small pets are
considered to belong to the private sphere, where regulatory intervention by the state is more difficult to
justify.
5 ‘Cooperation and concurrence between professional bureaucrats. The case of food safety reforms in
Switzerland’, project financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (No 10001A_159308, 2015–2017).
6 SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) is a statistical analysis and forecasting software specifically
designed for the social sciences that allows descriptive statistics of social trajectories to be produced.
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to their membership of the veterinary profession. As a result, the more closely antibiotics are
controlled by public policy, the more state veterinarians negotiate with representatives of
practising veterinarians (Part 3). We will conclude that the empowerment and legitimisation
of the bureaucratic segment of the profession are far from linear processes.
Morphology of the veterinary profession
In Switzerland, the federal government (national level) is organised into seven major
‘ministries’, called Federal Departments. Within the Federal Department of Home
Affairs, veterinarians work in the Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office (FSVO)
and the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH). This is a relatively recent
reorganisation. Until 2015, the Federal Veterinary Office was part of the Federal
Department of Economic Affairs, at the same hierarchical level as the Federal Office
for Agriculture (FOAG). A liaison structure between the offices, the Federal Food
Chain Unit, based at the FSVO, was created in 2007 following the mad cow crisis.
Separating veterinary affairs from agriculture, as has been done elsewhere in Europe
(Alam 2009; Janning 2008), does not lead to an increase in the number of posts for
veterinary bureaucrats at the federal level (Table 1). Indeed, many public veterinary
tasks fall within the remit and budgets of the cantons. In total, there are approximately 20
active federal veterinarians and about 120 cantonal veterinarians, distributed as follows:
In other countries, public veterinarians may be managed by generalist civil servants
who impose their own health or management standards (Alam 2007, for France and
Great Britain). In Switzerland, due to the way in which veterinarians are recruited (see
Box 2) and the administration is structured (departments are small), professional
veterinary bureaucrats combine the two roles.
Public veterinarians have a complex relationship with other parts of the profession.7 They
are by nomeans all members of the SwissVeterinary Society (SVS), which has almost 3000
members (90% of the profession). The number of public veterinarians who are members of
the SVS has decreased from 131 in 2010 to 108 in 2018, out of a total of around 170,
representing a membership rate of 77 to 64%. About half our interviewees are members of
the SVS: 2 out of the 4 working at the federal level and 10 out of 18 at the cantonal level.
Table 1 Distribution of veterinary bureaucrats by institution
Territorial level Position Approximate number
Cantonal Heads of department, chief assistants 40
Cantonal Employees 80
Federal (FSVO) Heads of units/sections + employees 20
Both Retired 30
Total: 170
7 It should be noted that the administrative services are not structured according to the division between rural
and urban veterinarians, but according to four themes: ‘primary production control’, ‘animal health’ (including
the monitoring of epizootics and zoonoses and of medicinal products), ‘animal protection’ (including animal
welfare and the supervision of animal experiments) and ‘veterinary laboratories’.
Torn between responsibility and loyalty: how the veterinarian...
These figures suggest that veterinary bureaucrats are at a certain remove from the SVS. One
reason for this is that membership of the national organisation is not compulsory in order to
practice; another is that the heads of the cantonal veterinary departments have their own
association, the Association of cantonal veterinarians. In sum, administrative veterinarians
are vastly outnumbered by the 1724 practising veterinarians in the SVS (the rest of the
members work in research or for private companies), of which 60% are women who tend to
specialise in small animals rather than livestock (Surdez 2009). In contrast, only 41% of
administrative veterinarians are women, which puts paid to the idea that this is a particularly
female segment of the bureaucracy. These few figures show that the regulation of this
profession is not entirely controlled by the state, unlike in France, where the state plays a
central role and membership of the Order is compulsory (Bonnaud and Fortané 2018).8
In Switzerland, veterinarians train at the ‘Vetsuisse’ faculties in either Bern or Zurich. The 
studies, in German, last five years with a specialisation from the fourth year in either
‘livestock’, ‘pets’, ‘horses’, ‘biopathology’, ‘biomedical research’ or ‘veterinary public 
health’, the last option being a latecomer dating from the creation of a Veterinary Public 
Health Institute in 2009. For the non-clinical route, the final year is mainly carried out in the 
clinics or pathology institutes at the two universities. Swiss veterinarians do not need to 
follow ‘classes préparatoires’ before entering veterinary school as veterinarians in France do. 
For a long time, Swiss professional-bureaucrats trained ‘on the job’. In 2011, two new legal 
texts, the ‘Ordinance on the training, further training and continuing education of people in 
the public veterinary service’ and the ‘Ordinance on the training and examination of persons 
responsible for the enforcement of food law’, were enacted to professionalise administrations
responsible for food safety. Either before obtaining a position in the state services or once in 
post, veterinarians must obtain a ‘Certificate of competence as official veterinarian’ through 
practical and theoretical training (knowledge of legislation) followed by an examination 
before a peer committee. They have to work at least 30% of a full-time equivalent.
The careers of public and private veterinarians gradually diverge. Access through continuing 
education rather than competitive examination can make it easier for practitioners to 
transition into administration. Among our interviewees, public veterinarians presented the 
administrative route as more stable and predictable. For those with few inherited financial 
and social resources, it is an alternative to liberal practice, which is not very conducive to 
ambitious career development. It also offers an opportunity to those for whom the academic 
route has proved too challenging or who experience health problems at work. They give 
meaning to their work by contrasting the collective dimension of public health with the 
individual and routine approach of liberal practice and by pointing out that they have to 
respond to emergencies such as epizootics or problems in primary production likely to 
contaminate food. In our sample, 14 out of 26 public veterinarians briefly worked in private 
practice (between one and three years on average) after finishing their studies, the only time 
that they experienced clinical use of antibiotics. Those who moved to an administrative 
career later – between five and fifteen years after graduation – were active in research, 
mainly public funded research, but did not focus on antibiotics. Having obtained their 
diplomas in veterinary medicine more than twenty years ago (n = 16) or more than ten years 
ago (n = 9),
8
the veterinarians interviewed, even from different generations, considered that 
the subject of antibiotic resistance was only touched upon during their training.
Box 2 Veterinary bureaucrats and practitioners: career differentiation
8 We note one missing piece of data on this subject for one of our respondents.
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The commitment to reform and control before AMR policies
Although the problem of antibiotic resistance may now be formulated differently, with
an emphasis on the One Health principle, the public policy put in place to deal with it is
part of a much long process.
Since the 1990s, and throughout Europe, administrative entities involved in animal
health and food safety have been restructured with the aim of reforming modes of
regulation and of limiting health risks and crises (Janning 2008; Ollivier 2013;
Thomann 2018). These changes have moved veterinary affairs away from agriculture
ministries and closer to health ministries. The number of public veterinarians is said to
have increased, as well as their room for manoeuvre and their legitimacy, both within
central and decentralised administration (Alam 2007; Alam 2009, for England and
France). Different administrative structures are expected to collaborate more closely
(Jerolmack 2013), and certification procedures (especially for services and laboratories)
have been entrusted to private actors (Verbruggen and Havinga 2017). Public policies
to combat antibiotic resistance, which have been gaining prominence at the global level
since the 2000s and especially 2010, continue to promote coordinated action between
human and veterinary medicine.
In Switzerland, in contrast with the public debates here and elsewhere in response to
the health crises of the 1990s, reforms to antibiotic use in veterinary medicine were
almost exclusively discreetly negotiated between the state and veterinarians, without
public intervention by politicians or media coverage.9 The topics discussed were the
policy for regulating therapeutic products and the veterinary profession’s monopoly on
the distribution of medicinal products.
The first major reform was revising the ‘Federal ordinance on veterinary medicinal
products’, finalised in 2004 (Sager et al. 2014; Thomann et al. 2018), which concerns
medicinal products and specialisations as a whole. It increased the capacity of federal
and cantonal veterinary services to monitor veterinarians’ work by introducing the
obligation to document prescriptions in a logbook and for practices’ medicine cabinets
to be inspected. This new mandate gave veterinary bureaucrats greater authority over
practising veterinarians. The SVS, which has been taking a close interest since the
2000s, asked its members to accept the new arrangements, in order to avoid the more
drastic reform of a ban on sales, which it firmly opposes.10
Implementing checks proved particularly difficult, especially when it came to
medicinal products prescribed by veterinarians on an earlier visit and stored by farmers.
This left its mark on our interviewees:
It was very badly received […] I experienced this period: ‘What’s this? It’s
impossible, it’s an insurmountable constraint’ from both veterinarians and animal
keepers. (Vet3, head of department, 46 years old, canton 1, 11/12/2015)
9 In this period, regulations of veterinary medicinal products varied from country to country. For example, in
Denmark, which sets a benchmark, practitioners were banned from selling antibiotics and were instead
compensated for monitoring farms.
10 Annual activity reports of the SVS, 2011–2017, available on the SVS’s homepage.
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It’s clear most veterinary practitioners are not happy when we arrive. But most of
them think ‘Well, if we have to do it, then let’s do it’. And there are a few who are
against it and get angry. We have to live with it… (Vet17, employee, 56, canton
3, 03/02/2017)
The heads of the cantonal services do not have sufficient human resources to inspect
private practices, which is all the more delicate as inspections involve peers and a
network of acquaintances (Thomann et al. 2018). Indeed, the veterinary departments of
two of the cantons that we investigated entrusted the inspection of medicine cabinets to
neighbouring cantons.
The next stage came in 2010, with the revision of the ‘Veterinary Therapeutic
Products Act’. The SVS made its voice heard and acted as an intermediary, advocating
to drastically reduce so-called ‘reserve’ antibiotic use in animal health (‘reserve’
antibiotics being those that should only be prescribed as a last resort for humans).
The Society consequently encouraged practitioners to carry out laboratory diagnostics
in order to assess precisely whether antibiotics are necessary and to promote both
regular check-ups of herds and vaccination programmes. But it also fought to retain
veterinarians’ right to sell medicinal products, using a range of arguments: financial
(their sale is an important source of revenue), expertise (veterinarians ensure that
prescriptions are respected), client convenience (emergency access and treatment are
facilitated) and the fact that in certain German-speaking cantons doctors are allowed to
sell medication.
The administrative management of the antibiotic resistance problem over this period
can thus be described as the convergence of two processes: firstly, the gradual
implementation of a system of checks on antibiotics involving veterinary departments
and practitioners’ representatives and, secondly, the One Health framing of the prob-
lem, which aims to respond to the call of international organisations (World Health
Organization, World Organization for Animal Health, European Union) and entails
further state regulation. The ability of state veterinarians to influence the outcome
would henceforth depend on their relationships with other professional bureaucrats, at
both the federal and cantonal levels.
The division of labour among bureaucrats: delegation or increased
legitimacy of veterinarians?
From May 2015, states were strongly encouraged to develop national action plans to
address antibiotic resistance. In Switzerland, the Strategy on Antibiotic Resistance
(StAR), which officially involves the Offices of human health, veterinary health,
agriculture and the environment to the same degree, was adopted in November 2015
(Box 1). As we shall see, veterinary bureaucrats managed to maintain control over the
development of measures concerning veterinary medicine and thus over their profes-
sional territory in relation to other administrative entities. For the professional bureau-
crats of the other Offices, recognising veterinarians’ ownership of this problem in their
area was also a way of delegating the work to them and of making them responsible for
the success of the action plan. As for the cantonal veterinarians associated with
implementing it, as bureaucrats in direct contact with practitioner veterinarians
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(building on Lipsky’s work on street-level bureaucrats, see Hupe and Hill 2007), those
close relationships raised dilemmas for them.
Federal veterinary bureaucrats making AMR a priority
In Switzerland, it was managers and staff in the federal Offices who made AMR a
priority. Assuming responsibility for it was a kind of test of their practical and symbolic
legitimacy. Would they be able to set up homogenous monitoring systems throughout
the country, particularly after having been restructured (see section 1 above)? They
took on the role of bureaucrats who could see the big picture and, as such, took
responsibility for anticipating crises and convincing cantonal bureaucrats to participate
in implementing the plan. Among the administrative entities involved, the Communi-
cable Diseases Division within the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) coordinated
the various measures planned:
OK, so this is a very important activity for which we have also received quite
substantial new resources. We are the ones who started this project or who
initiated the joint strategy project with the other departments. (M1, doctor, FOPH,
58 years old, Bern, 02/11/ 2015)
The doctors, epidemiologists and social scientists in this division saw the StAR as an
opportunity to strengthen their position in relation to the other Offices by promoting a
crosscutting approach which employed the prevention and communication strategies
used for infectious diseases:
The WHO’s first action plan was a long time ago, but it didn’t play such an
important role, and I think it’s because we were thinking in too much of a sector-
specific way […] and I think that the mindset is different now. (B1, project
manager biologist, FOPH, Bern, 02/05/2016)
However, the professionals of this Office took great care to empower the different types
of professionals and to preserve their field of activity (‘Everyone must get their own
house in order’, M1). On the one hand, their limited competence in veterinary medicine
prevented them from interfering in the specific jurisdiction of veterinarians. Thus, one
senior doctor (M1) said that he discovered during initial meetings that, in veterinary
medicine, data on resistance concern dead animals more than those under treatment,
due to the cost of antimicrobial susceptibility testing, whereas the opposite is true in
human medicine; it was therefore necessary to design sector-specific monitoring
systems. On the other hand, the aim was to rally the veterinarians of the Federal Food
Safety and Veterinary Office (FSVO) who, in 2015, had just been transferred to the
Department of the Home Affairs, to a common strategy focused on prevention.
For the FSVO, the challenge with the StAR was to institute systems for monitoring
veterinary medicinal products, primarily antibiotics, on a national scale by enlisting
cantonal veterinarians. The aim was to demonstrate that the veterinary profession was
capable of self-regulating its use of antibiotics, so that, practically, a broad variety of
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antibiotics remained available and, symbolically, veterinarians avoided stigmatisation.
For one veterinarian in a senior position at the FSVO, antibiotic resistance was an
opportunity to move the profession towards a more prevention-oriented veterinary
medicine. With a view to ‘converting’ practitioner veterinarians, shared by most FSVO
staff members, he wanted to see expert veterinary advice symbolically and financially
re-evaluated, relative to the prescription and sale of medicinal products, mainly
antibiotics:
It means this: if you are a farmer and I can advise you on how you can fatten your
calves without using antibiotics, and if it takes me hours to explain this to you, I
should be able to earn my money with this advice, and not by selling you
medicinal products. (Vet7, FSVO, 57, Bern, 02/02/2016)
However, the FSVO does not really have the leverage to bring in this new pricing
system, since the profession sets the price for services and the StAR does not allocate
any financial resources for this. This senior veterinarian set himself a more attainable
objective, which fell within his remit: strengthening the system for monitoring the
tonnage of antibiotics used in veterinary medicine:
The aim is to have an overview of who, when and what quantity of antibiotics are
used. That is our goal, that is my goal. (Vet7)
Thus, a group of veterinary bureaucrats involved in monitoring the veterinary profes-
sion at the federal level asserted itself within the FSVO, with those responsible for the
‘human health’ side letting them decide on the best course of action. But were these
veterinarians challenged by professionals working in or with food safety units?
Other professional bureaucrats’ contribution to defining AMR as an animal health
problem
The measures that veterinary bureaucrats advocate under the StAR also depended on
the dynamics of the groups of bureaucrats involved in food safety and animal health
issues, mainly chemical engineers and agronomists.
In Switzerland, chemists, whether chemical engineers or laboratory technicians, are
the main professionals involved in monitoring processed products, through both
scientific analysis and administrative procedures. Since they had been grouped with
veterinarians in food safety units at the federal level and in most cantons in the course
of the decade from 2010, they could have influenced the policies to combat antibiotic
resistance. Chemical engineers had a very different approach to that of veterinary
bureaucrats. This can be explained by their training (prestige of the discipline in
Switzerland, periods in the private sector, see Surdez et al. 2018) and their monopoly
on a certain type of analysis, among which the antimicrobial susceptibility testing (this
laboratory technique targets infectious agents in order to determine their resistance to
antibiotics). From their point of view, their main task was to monitor foodstuffs,
including for fraud, an area which they did not associate at all with monitoring
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agricultural production. Consequently, although they did not deny the issues around
AMR, according to our analysis of interviews, they associated it with two main items:
‘we are in the background’ and ‘veterinarians’. In their order of priorities, it was on a
par with pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) or nanoparticles. The chemists framed AMR as a specifically human and
animal health issue and not as a food safety issue. From this point of view, managing
the problem involves veterinarians controlling antibiotic use further back in the food
chain, as this cantonal chemist expressed it:
In the end, it is the use [of antibiotics] that is central, in production, I mean. We
must intervene as far back in the chain as possible […] Yes, yes, legally it is not
relevant whether bacteria are resistant or not. It is a public health problem because
antibiotics are no longer effective. It is not primarily a food safety problem, but a
medical problem. Here I am speaking from the point of view of our legal mission
of implementation. (Chem6, cantonal chemist, 50 years old, Bern, 30/09/2016)
By framing the issue in this way, they minimised their own responsibility and
emphasised the veterinarians’ responsibility. They did not envisage changing how they
analysed samples and carried out susceptibility testing, nor the standards that they
followed. In practical terms, neither the procedures for measuring antibiotic residues in
food nor the tolerated amounts changed. The use of antimicrobial susceptibility testing
seemed to them to be a method that would be difficult to roll out more widely for
reasons of cost (farmers would have to pay the veterinarian) and feasibility (the time it
would take to obtain and analyse the samples would be at odds with the urgency of
care). Although chemists acknowledged the presence of resistant bacteria in or on food,
particularly with imported vegetables, they deemed monitoring all imports to be out of
their remit and prioritised detecting bacteria (and not resistance) in locally produced
food. They did not intend to change their area of operations, their professional mandate
or their practices. Although they recognised the problem as a legitimate one, they
tended to assign responsibility for it to their veterinary colleagues.
The bureaucrats from the Federal Office for Agriculture (FOAG) and the Federal
Office for the Environment (FOE), who are officially stakeholders in the StAR, did not
consider AMR to be a priority problem either.11 This was perhaps particularly coun-
terproductive, as the FOAG had a potentially powerful tool with which to influence the
behaviour of livestock farmers. Indeed, in Swiss agricultural policy, farmers receive
subsidies, known as ‘direct payments’, on condition that they comply with criteria
defined and monitored by the FOAG. Although there have been recent discussions
within the FOAG on using part of these subsidies to reward prevention and reduced
antibiotic use, this lever has not yet been put to use.
11 In a joint report by the two offices (FOE and FOAG 2016) which sets out areas of action for the future of
agriculture, antibiotic resistance is only a sub-heading, associated firstly with water treatment (traces of
medicinal products not eliminated by treatment plants) and secondly with the spread of veterinary medicinal
products in soils. The impact of plant protection products and traces of heavy metals in soils are given more
space.
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While the FOAG has not yet taken any major steps towards preventing AMR, the
agricultural engineers who worked there respected the scientific expertise of the FSVO
veterinarians (in contrast to the chemists) and let them take the lead:
It is mainly the FSVO, because for everything that concerns animal health, for us,
the FSVO is certainly the reference. So what we do is practical things. (Eng8,
agricultural engineer at the FOAG, Bern, 12/07/2018)
This ‘practical’ aspect mainly concerned the safety of animal feed, following the long-
standing ban on antibiotics as growth promoters, and restrictions on the use of additives in
livestock feed. The role of the interviewee just mentioned was in fact to monitor these
dossiers, to draw up up-to-date lists of the feedstuffs concerned and to inform veterinarians
and farmers. It was only more recently that AMR was given greater prominence within the
‘Safety of Primary Production’Unit of the FOAG,which used concerns for animal health as
a means to legitimise financial support for indigenous agriculture:
We deem that better animal health leads to lower antibiotic use. That’s kind of the
strategy we have. And given the public discussion today, and the fear that it
triggers, we would like to do something, in agriculture, to improve that. (Eng8)
For this reason, the FOAG developed policies to support research into farming systems
that consume fewer antibiotics. Nevertheless, it acknowledged the leadership of the
FSVO and veterinarians on this subject and did not seek to challenge it.
Thus, at the federal level, the various groups of professional bureaucrats seemed to
be willing to define the problem of antibiotic resistance as an animal health issue for
veterinarians to deal with. However, while federal public veterinarians seemed to take a
leading role in defining AMR policy, cantonal veterinarians adopted different attitudes.
Cantonal veterinarians faced with the dilemmas of proximity
Indeed, due to the federal structure of the Swiss bureaucracy, implementing these
policies requires the involvement of cantonal veterinary bureaucrats. The direc-
tors of the cantonal veterinary administrations (known as ‘cantonal veterinar-
ians’) must respect the federal administration’s guidelines and requests, while
adapting them to the political, administrative and professional circumstances at
cantonal level. In this interface position, they are directly responsible, together
with their teams, for putting into practice procedures for monitoring and
collecting data on antibiotic use in practices and, by extension, on farms. Faced
with these challenges, they have developed two ways of reconciling the profes-
sional and bureaucratic dimensions of their role. Their greater or lesser endorse-
ment of the new ways of managing food safety departments (certification and
audit procedures resulting from new public management, see Surdez et al. 2018)
is mirrored in whether they manage relations with practitioners in a more formal
or more flexible way (Box 3).
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Cantonal veterinarians in two out of the four cantons in which interviews were
conducted opted for a formal and strict conception of their role. They tended to follow
national guidelines to the letter and to legitimise any action undertaken as part of the
StAR. They had frequently taken additional training in team or project management, to
help establish their career within the administration. From this perspective, an element of
their role as a professional bureaucrat was introducing modernising reforms by promot-
ing new professional practices. As for the cantonal veterinarians whose attitude towards
management was less rigid and more oriented towards the veterinary profession, they
emphasised their close relationship with their practitioner peers and with farmers and
presented this proximity as the most effective and sustainable way of convincing
professionals in the field to change their practices, including those concerning antibi-
otics. They downplayed the urgency of the problem of antibiotic resistance (‘It is an
important issue in the veterinary field, but one that is overestimated’, Vet4) because they
thought it is necessary to give veterinarians and farmers time to adapt to the new
In describing their role, public veterinarians emphasise either their proximity with or distance 
from veterinary practitioners.
One cantonal head of department represents the first attitude (Vet4, cantonal veterinarian, 
60 years old, canton 3, 17/12/2015). She comes from an agricultural background and lives 
with a practising veterinarian. After obtaining her veterinary diploma in 1984, she spent over 
ten years in research on parasitology. Unable to find a stable position, she became a 
practitioner in a ‘mixed’ private practice (combining pet a livestock specializations), while 
also working at 50% in a cantonal administration. For her, practice alone was not ‘dynamic’
or intellectually challenging enough and she eventually focused on an administrative career 
in the same canton. Her experience as an independent practitioner is an essential reference 
point since she sees her role as dealing with practical issues, simply on a larger, public-health
scale. She maintains regular contact with practising veterinarians who keep her informed of 
problems and reactions in the field (she used the German word for ‘antennae’). She gave 
these close relationships as the reason for why she did not apply to run the whole department, 
which has included veterinary affairs and food safety since 2004. These relationships also 
allowed her to criticise peers who advocate certain measures without considering their 
practical feasibility (‘it just bothers me when bureaucracy increases’). From this perspective, 
she downplayed the urgency and seriousness of antibiotic resistance and described the StAR 
as ‘a big, floating, threatening cloud’ to be dealt with. While she saw the need to ‘sound the 
alarm’, she believed that technical solutions would be found and that practitioners should not 
be ‘asked too much’.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the head of department in another canton (Vet3, head 
of department, 49 years old, canton 1, 11/12/2015). His parents worked in the watchmaking 
industry and his grandparents were farmers. After a doctorate on gene therapy and a few 
months as a salaried veterinary practitioner (he never wished to open his own practice), he 
worked for ten years in the Porcine Health Sector within a semi-private, semi-public structure
called SUISAG that aims to optimise pig production and breeding. There he acquired both 
management experience and experience of advising farmers. Aiming to further his career, he 
developed his skills in veterinary public health and in the economic and safety aspects of 
food safety. He then branched off into the administration in his home canton, where he 
gradually climbed the ladder. He had a strict, ‘rules are rules’ discourse on applying 
standards and checks for antibiotic resistance, aiming for the same ‘efficiency’ that he sought
for his department. He did not deny the need for veterinary medicine to be involved in the 
fight against antibiotic resistance, but underlined that this responsibility should be shared by
human medicine and environmental departments.
Box 3 Professional bureaucrats between flexibility and formality
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standards for supervising medicine cabinets. This close relationship led them, for
example, to criticise the monitoring procedures for being at once too bureaucratic and
ineffective at reducing antibiotic use. This retired cantonal veterinarian, who witnessed
the implementation of procedures over many years, expressed the problem thus:
We can note that a veterinarian sells large quantities of antibiotics, except that if
for his practice he sells large quantities of antibiotics and then he can justify, for
example, if he sells medicinal concentrates, that he has the prescriptions that go
with it, that all the papers are correctly filled out, but what do you want us to say
to him? (Rvet1, retired cantonal veterinarian, 65 years old, canton 1, 14/03/2016)
Attitudes towards the problem of antibiotic resistance and the introduction of stronger
supervision also varied from sub-unit to sub-unit within cantonal administrations. Thus,
some veterinarians working in laboratories were closer to the chemists (see “Other
professional bureaucrats’ contribution to defining AMR as an animal health problem”)
in considering that the problem did not directly concern them. They put the onus first
onto practising veterinarians and then onto their colleagues in charge of animal health
units, as this veterinarian in charge of a laboratory testifies:
The question should be put to the customer-facing veterinarians because at
present, whether it is for small animal medicine or livestock, antibiotics are still
used a lot, sometimes even without a diagnosis. […] There are probably a lot of
habits that need to be changed. It’s not going to be easy, I have the impression,
seen from the outside, because it doesn’t concern us directly. (Vet9, laboratory
manager, 59 years old, canton 1, 05/04/2016)
However, other veterinarians working in the laboratories were more mindful of the
value of antimicrobial susceptibility tests and focused on prescribing habits gradually
becoming more targeted, as this interviewee indicated, in a mixture of exhortation,
wish, observation and identification with veterinary practitioners:
But don’t forget to take samples in order to be able to provide more targeted
antibiotic therapy. We can always change the protocols, so we take samples, we
give what we hope will help the animal at least to overcome the acute phase, and
then we start a more specific treatment. So yes, that’s something that is, at least
for trained veterinarians, I would say, for the last fifteen years, it’s part of the
routine. We have become used to not giving antibiotics just anyhow. (Vet11,
laboratory veterinarian, 37 years old, canton 1, 20/06/2016)
The cantonal veterinarians seemed to be caught between the conflicting demands of
their proximity to veterinarians and heightened monitoring procedures. Antibiotic
resistance policies have thus led to a divergence or even a fragmentation of the group
of veterinary bureaucrats most in contact with veterinary practitioners on a daily basis.
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Professional bureaucrats and professional organisations drawing
closer together at national level
How have the steps in the implementation of the StAR influenced the objectives of the
AMR policy and plan, with the veterinary profession being held accountable for the
reforms undertaken? How have cantonal state veterinarians carried out their delegated
mandate to monitor or even reduce the use of antibiotics in veterinary medicine? Has
the implementation of concrete measures amplified the difficulties and dilemmas raised
in the previous phases (see Parts 1 and 2)? We will examine two main tools of public
action, a therapeutic guide for practitioners and a database detailing the distribution of
antibiotics, and highlight the issues that they have raised for professional autonomy.
From the point of view of the sociology of professions, this stage has led to unprec-
edented regulation, with the authorities now contributing to defining ‘good clinical
practice’ (once the preserve of the professionals) and able to scrutinise prescriptions.
However, this regulation was carried out in close negotiation and collaboration with the
professional group, in this case through its representative organisation, the SVS.
In this crucial phase, the number of meetings between the FSVO, the Association of
cantonal veterinarians and the SVS went up to three or four per year. From 2016, the
SVS worked hard to strengthen ties with the veterinary bureaucracy (SVS Annual
Reports 2016 and 201712 and vice versa, with a closer collaboration between public
and private actors being advocated as a means of increasing the efficiency of public
policies without substantially increasing the costs to the federal administration (StAR
Report 2015).13 The relationships between veterinary bureaucrats and practitioner
representatives varied according to the system being put in place, ranging from an
‘educational’ stance of medical expertise that respected practitioners’ professional
territory to remote supervision using IT tools. Which instrument veterinary bureaucrats
chose affirmed their autonomy from the rest of the profession to a greater or lesser
degree.
An ‘educational’ approach to standardising treatment
Since the development of the StAR, the FSVO veterinarians have emphasised ‘educa-
tion’. This initially took the form of information sessions on the action plan for cantonal
veterinary bureaucrats, then for practising veterinarians. The sessions were not
organised systematically in each canton, but where heads of department wanted to
give the plan official authority, sometimes to show that the orders came from ‘above’.
Those in charge of antibiotic resistance at the FSVO then undertook to enlist veterinary
practitioners through a more professional, practical and scientific approach. They
established a working group to develop a booklet entitled ‘Prudent use of antibiotics.
A therapeutic guide for veterinarians’ (FSVO, 2016, 108 pages) which details the type
12 For example, ‘Today, the SVS is more frequently invited to participate in working groups and is included in
decisions’, 2016 Report, p. 17.
13 See ‘The various actors and interest groups have been involved from the outset in the development of the
strategy, and they will be called upon to play a leading role in its implementation’, p. 18.
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of antibiotic recommended for different animal species (especially cattle and pigs)
according to diseases and symptoms.14
This group, led by an FSVO veterinarian, was composed of seventeen ‘experts’,
including nine representatives from the two veterinary faculties in Switzerland, six SVS
representatives and two salaried veterinarians from the Bovine Health Department and
the Porcine Health Department, two semi-private advisory bodies. Its composition was
the result of informal personal contacts, with the FSVO official asking a veterinarian
employed by the SVS to recruit practitioners:
Actually, X (from the FSVO) phoned me and said: ‘Hey, we’d like to do this and
that. It would be nice if you joined in’. And then we say yes or no (laughs). And
yes, it was very important that we be involved, because otherwise we wouldn’t
have had a chance, if we hadn’t got involved (repeats) it would never have been
accepted by the practitioners or outside. (Vet24, veterinarian employed by the
SVS, Bern, 22/09/2017)
Here we can see how transactions between different types of actors from different
segments of the veterinary profession got underway. The FSVO’s professional bureau-
crats set up the meetings but left the content development to the SVS. On the SVS side,
increased state intervention in antibiotics led to a veterinarian being employed to
specialise in the issue, when previously the permanent staff had only constituted of a
lawyer, an accountant and secretaries. This new employee asked the presidents of the
SVS sections that seemed most affected to nominate the best ‘specialists’.
This group functioned as an interface between state and non-state veterinarians, in
which they could discuss professional issues, at the intersection between the political
arena, the workplace arena and the public arena (in the sense of clients and public
debate), which sociologists of professions identify as arenas where issues around
professional regulation are debated (Hénaut 2016). State veterinarians used this forum
to produce a tool, the ‘therapeutic guide’, and to give it both practical and scientific
legitimacy. The form to be given to the recommendations was discussed in the group. It
was possible to include the idea of ‘good practice’ in the guide by playing on the word
‘recommendation’—in the sense of both advice and instruction—in order to respect
both scientific standards (‘state of the art’, p. 3), legal standards and professional ethics
(‘the careful and conscientious exercise of the profession as required by the respect of
professional duties according to the law on the medical professions’, p. 3). The
emphasis placed on scientific standards by both veterinary bureaucrats and SVS
representatives paradoxically avoided stigmatising practitioners: thus, the two members
of the working group whom we interviewed considered it normal that practitioners
would not have time to keep up to date with the latest publications given their difficult
working conditions (Vet24; Vet25, researcher at the veterinary faculty, Bern, 25/09/
2017).
14 As part of a parallel research programme, a professor of pharmacology and toxicology has created an
internet portal allowing veterinarians to consult the classes of antibiotics recommended for
different treatments.
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Focused on the notion of ‘prudent use’, the guide defined the various classes of
antibiotics, ‘critical’ and ‘reserve’, but also the dosages, frequency and duration of
treatments and recommended an antimicrobial susceptibility test before changing
products. On the other hand, this first version made no mention of preventive means
or alternative treatments to reduce consumption in animal husbandry, which was
queried in parliament,15 thus highlighting what those consulted had taken for granted.
Despite precautions taken by the FSVO, when the guide was presented at public
meetings, the more reluctant practitioners questioned the degree of standardisation and
the binding nature of these recommendations. They expressed fears to veterinary
bureaucrats and the SVS (Vet24) that these guidelines would, on the one hand, give
rise to legal action on the part of farmers if they were not followed and, on the other
hand, that they would function as a sort of ‘blueprint’ or ‘recipe’ that would minimise
their professional expertise by allowing farmers to decide on the use of antibiotics, a
decision that had hitherto been the monopoly of the veterinary profession. In dealing
with antibiotic resistance, state veterinarians were thus faced with issues around the
definition of roles and the limits of a professional monopoly, as well as around
recommending alternatives to antibiotics.
Requiring practitioners to provide individualised data
In addition to this educational tool, the veterinary bureaucrats at the FSVO aimed to
implement a monitoring system,16 a cornerstone of all national action plans against
antibiotic resistance. This more coercive instrument would reinforce the supervision of
medicinal products, especially antibiotics, prescribed by practitioners, without
abolishing inspection visits, the difficult beginnings of which we have noted. The
objective is to systematically collect the data on the treatments administered by each
veterinarian, whether rural or urban, for each of their clients. Establishing these official
statistics raises crucial questions, both practical (Who is responsible for this work? How
precise should it be?) and in terms of who should have access to them (the adminis-
tration, the profession, researchers, the agri-food industry, the public?).
In line with previous regulations (2004 and 2010, see Part 1), the FSVO is
committed to developing a more accurate tool than the aggregated quantities by sector
supplied by firms, based on the logbooks that veterinarians and farmers have to keep.
Despite the StAR’s One Health framework, this level of monitoring of individual
private practitioners is not currently matched in human medicine, where the data focus
on hospitals. This can be seen as indicative of the weakness of the veterinary profes-
sion, which is nonetheless trying not to lose control of the situation completely.
The model that has been endorsed since 2016 in negotiations between the federal
and cantonal veterinary bureaucrats and the SVS is to ask individual practitioners to
report data to the FSVO. Veterinarians at the cantonal level simply spot-check the data
entered into the computer system. Unable to stop this, the professional organisation has
emphasised its willingness to cooperate and to be transparent while at the same time
15 The parliamentary motion is available on the homepage of the Swiss parliament: https://www.parlament.ch/
de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20183089.
16 Depending on the country, monitoring may include establishing an epidemiological surveillance system for
resistant bacteria, which involves monitoring cases of resistance, and a database on antibiotic use.
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fiercely discussing technical arrangements and financial compensation. The veterinar-
ian employed by the SVS relayed this position:
So the veterinarians have no problem with transmitting data so that the Confed-
eration knows which medicinal products they are prescribing, but they have a lot
of trouble with the fact that they have to do it themselves on their computer,
because it takes time. (Vet24, veterinarian, SVS, Bern, 22/09/2017)
The occupational group agreed to provide the data.17 In return, the designers configured
the software for collecting the data to be compatible with standard practice management
software (to avoid having to enter information about the same client twice) and to
automatically calculate waiting times (before the animals can be slaughtered or milk
sold), based on the time and method of injection of the antibiotic. Practitioners
cooperate with this system, which is still in the experimental phase, on the condition
that individual data are confidential and because they find it useful in practice. It is also
to demonstrate that they are not afraid of the scrutiny of their fellow bureaucrats and
that their prescriptions are not motivated by profit, as the representative of the SVS has
argued:
It’s perfidious to think that someone intentionally sold it for... because there are
other things one can sell. (Vet24)
This professional defence strategy does not rule out collective and individual opposi-
tion, which manifests through negotiations over compulsory data for each kind of
animal. However, it also preserves the profession’s business model, which remains
based on the sale of medicinal products. Beyond encouraging words, it is difficult for
public veterinary departments to promote remuneration for advice and prevention, as
the profession remains very much oriented towards liberal practice and geographically
scattered.18 Although the introduction of automated data transmission involved repre-
sentatives of practising veterinarians to make it acceptable, it could also have a ratchet
effect and the SVS may not be consulted as much on this subject in the future.
Conclusion: concerted changes to the profession and its regulation
Policies developed to address the problem of AMR in veterinary medicine are struc-
tured by the ambivalent relationships of veterinarians working for the administration
with their professional group of origin. Trained as veterinarians but having branched off
into public administration in the course of their career, these professional bureaucrats
adopt different positions towards monitoring antibiotic use, ranging from instituting
17 According to a dual tracing system, firms would also be obliged to indicate to whom they have sold what
quantities, which would be quite an achievement: ‘They are being put on the spot...’ (veterinarian specialised
in IT systems, FSVO, 35, Bern, 17/07/2018).
18 In 2017, 617 veterinarians worked in individual practices, 388 in group practices and 281 were salaried
(SVS Report 2017).
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binding public health measures to understanding the issues related to professional
practice. Depending on their place in the administrative hierarchy, they tend to take
on either a role of reformer-innovator involving mediation and pedagogy, or one of
supervisor or spokesperson for practitioners. Although, based on the One Health
principle, other administrative professionals (mainly doctors, chemical engineers or
agronomists) can intervene in the implementation of the national action plan, it is
ultimately the federal veterinary bureaucrats who define and implement the measures,
in particular a much-discussed database on individual antibiotic use. However, they
cannot or do not wish to redefine prescribing practices without negotiating with the
organisation that represents the profession, the SVS, and agreeing to at least some of its
demands, even if some instruments may have ratchet effects.
The autonomy of the veterinary bureaucrats from the rest of the profession is
therefore limited, in particular due to the monopolistic position of the SVS compared
with the association representing administrative veterinarians. Moreover, these actors
share some common interests, if not around the gradual transition towards a more
reasonable use of antibiotics, then at a more structural level around the preservation of
the profession’s income.
At this stage of the study, no unprecedented coalitions between segments of the
professional group and segments of the administration have emerged to implement a
paradigm shift, such as payment for prevention becoming widespread. In the interests
of the entire profession being treated consistently, all veterinary practitioners, including
urban ones, will certainly be required to provide information on the antibiotics that they
prescribe, even though urban practitioners are far less likely to be compensated for
preventive services than rural ones. As the database for the systematic collection of data
on the use of medicinal products is still under construction, we are not in a position to
predict the exact uses to which state veterinarians will put those data, nor whether the
systematic collection of data will lead to a real reduction in the quantities and types of
antibiotics used. It will be interesting to see how the law banning the prophylactic use
of antibiotics, adopted by the European Parliament in 2018, will be applied—some
interviewees stating that the veterinary profession will always have the right to use
antibiotics preventively if they deem it necessary, but that breeders will not be allowed
to keep and administer them themselves.
A detailed examination of the public policy instruments put in place within a country
reveals that methods of regulating antibiotic resistance and the profession change
gradually, on the basis of previous arrangements. In Switzerland, given the relatively
recent increase in public veterinarians’ operational capacity and legitimacy, state
intervention still relies heavily on the professional organisation, which has long used
its clout to get the public authorities to endorse how professionals, both practitioners
and bureaucrats, define how the profession should function, which amounts to self-
regulation (Demazière 2018). On the basis of the results presented here, it will be
particularly interesting to carry out a comparative analysis with other national plans
against AMR in Europe which, despite their family resemblance, differ in the details of
the measures taken and in the configurations of stakeholders, particularly in terms of
the power relationships between the medical and veterinary professions, between
sectors of the administration or between the veterinary profession and agricultural
interest groups.
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